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I. INTRODUCTION
The development of the Internet has worked the most profound
change in human communication since the invention of the printing
press.' Internet users can access an almost limitless array of informa-
tion with the click of a mouse. Just as the Internet has revolutionized
the way businesses conduct their work, it has profound implications
for education generally, and public schools specifically.
Few would dispute that schools should provide their students with
the necessary training to use the Internet wisely and effectively. Fa-
miliarity with computer technology and the Internet is vital to our
children's future. However, the entry of K-12 schools into the Infor-
mation Age has created a legal minefield regarding students' and em-
ployees' use of the Internet and e-mail both during and outside school
time. Access to the Internet and e-mail has led to numerous abuses
that have been both embarrassing and unlawful. Students have been
caught using the Internet to visit pornographic or hate group web
sites, or to post derogatory and sometimes even slanderous informa-
tion about their teachers. School employees have been discovered us-
ing the Internet to gamble, to run private businesses, and to solicit
dates and romantic relationships with students. Other computer
users have gained access to schools' web sites to add "hypertext" links
to their own churches or private businesses, or have violated copyright
laws by copying, using, and distributing commercial software pro-
grams without authorization. There are myriad ways for people to
misuse the Internet and e-mail, and schools are particularly vulnera-
ble to such abuses.
Schools find themselves in the unenviable position of trying to nav-
igate between state-sponsored censorship and state-aided pornogra-
phy distribution. Both sides are fraught with constitutional and
statutory dangers. The censorship of constitutionally-protected
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
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speech is clearly problematic, but so too is providing young students
access to pornographic materials. The problems also exist regarding
school employees. This article will trace, to the extent it is marked by
judicial interpretation, the fine line between the limits to censorship
and a school's obligation to control the use of public resources.
Since this article was written, Congress has passed the Children's
Internet Protection Act,2 which requires all public schools and public
libraries to filter their Internet access in order to be permitted to use
federal funds to finance their computers and Internet access. How-
ever, this article is still relevant for several reasons. First, the schools
and libraries have a choice to forgo the computer- and Internet-related
federal funds in order to keep their Internet access filter-free. Second,
the filters which will be in use are not perfect and many leave some
problems to be solved by other means suggested below. Finally, this
Act may not survive the courts. The very balance which is the subject
of this article may not have been reached in this Act. The American
Civil Liberties Union and the American Library Association have al-
ready filed suit to block the new law. In the past, the United States
Supreme Court struck down the 1996 Communications Decency Act
similarly aimed at protecting children from on-line pornography.3
The Children's Online Protection Act was seen by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals as violating the First Amendment. 4 That Act is now
on hold until the Supreme Court can decide the case. This new 2001
law differs from those previous two and may withstand the courts'
scrutiny, but the challenges have already begun and the final result is
unknown. It is certain that the courts will employ some of the same
analyses included below to find the thin legal ground that exists be-
tween unconstitutional censorship and the duty to create a healthy,
safe environment in our schools and libraries.
II. THE NEED TO REGULATE
There is widespread agreement that children's access to dangerous
or questionable material on the Internet is a problem. One recent
study discovered that sixty percent of children's access to the Internet
takes place outside the home, principally in schools and libraries.5
However, the Internet contains an enormous amount of information
that should not be accessed by primary and secondary school students.
2. Children's Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
3. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
4. See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000).
5. See ZDNet, Innocence vs. Freedom: Kids Online Summit - "Public Education
Issues," Audio Archive for December 1997 Internet Online Summit: Focus on
Children (Dec. 2, 1997) (last visited Mar. 8, 2001) <http'//www5.zdnet.com/zdnn/
special/kids_radio.html>, available at Kids Online, Summit Archives (last visited
Mar. 8, 2001) <http://www.kidsonline.org/archives>.
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Experts estimate there are more than 12,000,000 pages of pornogra-
phy on the Internet, comprising 1.5% of all Internet content.6 Provid-
ers add 500 new pornography sites and 200 hate sites on-line every
day.7 Students can access this material intentionally, inadvertently,
or innocently. For example, during the National Aeronautic and
Space Administration's Mars Mission, NASA officials encouraged
school children to view and download photos of the planet on NASA's
web page. NASA's URL (Uniform Resource Locator) is www.NASA.
gov. However, many students mistakenly typed in www.NASA.com,
which took them to a banner pornography site with direct free links to
hard core sexual photographs.8 After press coverage focused attention
on the situation, the providers shut down the NASA.com site, but
many other examples of deceptive URLs still exist.9
Solutions to these problems are varied. Software can be incorpo-
rated into a computer which blocks certain web sites from being ac-
cessed. Other software can filter out web pages that contain words
likely to be on inappropriate sites.3O Schools can also install custom-
ized monitoring systems which examine all network activity and re-
port potential problems.11 Each of these measures can help mitigate
the problem of access to pornography, but each comes with its own set
of legal and constitutional problems.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS
A. Material Posted on the Internet is Protected Speech
The First Amendment does not protect all speech in all places, 12
but the United States Supreme Court has deemed the Internet as a
whole to be a forum where the highest degree of First Amendment
protection should apply. In Reno v. ACLU,13 the Court struck down
6. See Lawrence & Giles, Accessibility of Information on the Web, NATURE, July
1999, at 7.
7. See John M. Conlin, Monitoring Employee's [sic] Internet Activity: Invasion of Pri-
vacy or Simply Good Business Practice? (last visited Mar. 8, 2001) <http'/esniff.
comldbj_op-edl-28-00.html>.
8. See Charles Brewer, Web Lets You Join Trip to Mars, CincnNATi ENQUIRER, July
13, 1997, at 105, available in 1997 WL 5459052; Scott Kirsner, NASAcom Back
in Orbit, WIRED NEWS (July 18, 1997) (last visited Mar. 8, 2001) <http'J/www.
wired.com/nevs/politics/0,1283,5325,00.html>.
9. See, e.g., <http:J/www.whitehouse.com>.
10. For detailed information, see <http'J/www.filteringfacts.org> and <http'//www.
zdimag.com/zdlabs/police.net>.
11. See Jennifer Beauprez, Many Companies Monitor Workers' Web-Surfing Habits,
DENVER POST, March 13, 2000, at C01, available in 2000 WL 4455635.
12. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672
(1992) (holding that airport terminal is not a traditional public forum, and speech
there is afforded less protection than on a public sidewalk).
13. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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parts of the Communications Decency Act,i4 holding that the Internet
was one of the purest forms of free speech. The Court observed that in
the virtual world, "any person with a phone line can become a town
crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soap-
box."'15 This is quintessentially the speech the First Amendment was
written to protect. To survive constitutional scrutiny, restrictions on
protected speech in a public forum must be the least restrictive means
that can accomplish a compelling governmental purpose.
Obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment. In
1973, the Court clarified that this category of unprotected speech con-
sists of "patently offensive" speech without any "literary, artistic, po-
litical, or scientific value."16 However, last year, the Court gave
pornographic television programming First Amendment protection
and found that Congress's efforts to restrict it were unconstitu-
tional.1 7 Congress had passed a statute requiring cable sex channels
either to "fully scramble or otherwise fully block" those channels or to
limit their transmission to hours when children were unlikely to be
viewing (set by administrative regulation to be between 10 p.m. and 6
a.m).18 The Playboy Channel sued, claiming that the statute was
overly broad in limiting Playboy's ability to broadcast its program-
ming. The Supreme Court agreed. It held that Playboy's program-
ming enjoys First Amendment protection and that the government's
interest in shielding children from sexual images was insufficient to
justify the overly broad restrictions.1 9 The court wrote: "[E]ven where
speech is indecent and enters the home, the objective of shielding chil-
dren does not suffice to support a blanket ban if the protection can be
accomplished by a less restrictive alternative."20
Thus, when school administrators restrict student and employee
access to pornography via the Internet, they must be mindful of the
First Amendment protections afforded to this information. However,
that does not mean that school officials cannot regulate Internet use.
B. Employees' First Amendment Rights
1. First Amendment Considerations: Whose Computer Is It
Anyway?
Private employers own their computers and may place any restric-
tions on computer use they see fit. However, as public schools are
14. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
15. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
16. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
17. See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 120 S. Ct.
1878 (2000).
18. 47 U.S.C. § 2561(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1999); 47 C.F.R. § 76.227 (1999).
19. See Playboy Entertainment, 120 S. Ct. at 1893.
20. Id. at 1886-87.
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arms of the State, the government owns their computer resources.
First Amendment freedom of speech and expression protections there-
fore apply to school districts' regulations. And they must consider
First Amendment issues before adopting any computer use policy.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the government, sim-
ilar to a private property owner, has the "power to preserve the prop-
erty under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."2 1
Unfortunately, the courts have yet to provide much guidance as to the
way the First Amendment will be interpreted regarding computer net-
works. However, the Supreme Court has determined that there are
three types of forums: public forums, limited public forums, and non-
public forums.2 2 In turn, the type of forum determines the kinds of
limitations that the government may impose.
Public forums are "places which by long tradition or by government
fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate," such as streets and
parks.2 3 Limited public forums consist of public property that the gov-
ernment has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive
activity. In a limited public forum, a public entity may not enforce
restrictions on speech, even if it was not required to create the forum
in the first place. Although the government is not required to retain
the open nature of the forum indefinitely, as long as it does so, it is
bound by the same standards that apply in a traditional public forum.
A non-public forum is "[plublic property which is not by tradition or
designation a forum for public communications."2 4
The determination whether a forum is open, limited, or non-public
depends, in large part, on the type of forum the government intended
to create. The government's intention may be evidenced by its policies
and practices, as well as by the nature of the property and its compati-
bility with expressive activity. It is unlikely that a court would find an
employer's computer network to be an open or traditional public fo-
rum; the courts have reserved such status for parks and city streets,
and they have shown no signs of expanding this category of forum.
Therefore, a public entity's computer network is more likely either a
21. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
22. With non-public forums, the state may preserve the forum for its intended pur-
pose, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation of speech is reasona-
ble. Control over access to a non-public forum can be based on subject matter and
speaker identity so long as the distinctions are reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum and the restrictions are viewpoint-neutral. See Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
23. In these quintessential public forums, the government may prohibit content-
based communicative activity only when it can show that its regulation is neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest and that any restrictions placed on
speech are narrowly drawn to that end. Reasonable time, place, and manner re-
strictions are permissible.
24. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
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limited public forum or a non-public forum. If its computer policy
clearly defines the entity's intent, the statement of intent will proba-
bly be the single most important factor in determining the type of
forum.
To be consistent with an intent to create a non-public forum, a pub-
lic entity should restrict authorized uses to those which are consistent
with the entity's mission and legitimate goals. Personal use should
not be permitted, and all other uses inconsistent with the entity's mis-
sion and goals should be prohibited.
However, even if the entity has created a limited public forum, it
may properly limit the nature of that forum by restricting the use of
computer resources to specified purposes. For example, the entity
could declare that since it only has limited computer resources, the
use of those resources must be restricted to matters that are related to
the mission and goals of the entity.
On the other hand, the decision to permit a broader use of a com-
puter system is primarily a policy judgment. When making this type
of decision, the governing body must be aware of all the ramifications
of its decision, such as the decreased control inherent in limited-public
forums and public forums. Accordingly, users of the computer re-
sources will have much stronger arguments against any form of gov-
ernment restriction. Thus, it is crucial to remember that though the
government may own the computer system, it must not, through
stated policy or consistent practice, do anything to give away the right
to effectively control its use.
Although the government as sovereign cannot easily restrict the
citizens' consummate rights of free speech, the government as em-
ployer has more leeway. The government has a greater ability to ap-
ply some otherwise unconstitutional restrictions on its employees'
speech. 25 This expanded ability, of course, is not unlimited, and all
restrictions are subject to review for overbreadth and insufficient gov-
ernmental interest.2 6 The state employees in a school setting where
some of these blocking, filtering, and monitoring programs are being
used might not have a very persuasive claim of constitutional right
deprivation.
A federal appeals court recently applied these principles in a case
asking whether an employee had a right to access pornographic mate-
rial through a school's computers. It began when the State of Virginia
enacted a law barring all state employees from using state computers
to access, download, print, or store files having "sexually explicit con-
25. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion) ("[Tihe gov-
ernment as employer ... has far broader powers than does the government as
sovereign." (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968))).
26. See United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465
(1995); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
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tent."2 7 Professors at state colleges and universities sued in Urofsky
v. Allen2 S claiming that the statute violated their First Amendment
rights because it restricted access to material needed in their aca-
demic pursuits. The district court ruled in favor of the employees. 2 9
In an en banc decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed.30 It relied on the United States Supreme Court's analysis in
Connick v. Myers3 l to determine whether the professors had a First
Amendment right to access, download, print, or store files having "sex-
ually explicit content" from their workplace. The court focused on
whether the employees were speaking as government employees or as
private citizens touching upon matters of public concern.3 2 Although
the location of the speech - computers on the school premises - was
deemed irrelevant to this inquiry,3 3 the court still found that the
plaintiffs' speech-interest in accessing obscene materials from state-
owned computers to enhance their teaching ability did not constitute
the right of a private citizen to speak on matters of public concern.3 4
Were a school employee to claim that his free speech rights were vio-
lated by a software program on the school computer system which
blocks access to obscene sites, the judicial analysis would likely resem-
ble this assessment of the Virginia law which prohibits access.
In Loving v. Boren,3 5 the University of Oklahoma established a
measure which effectively limited access to news groups whose con-
tent was deemed potentially obscene. A professor sued, alleging that
the policy violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The dis-
trict court refused to declare the policy unconstitutional, holding that
the university may limit the use of the computers to "the very [pur-
poses] for which the system was purchased." Furthermore, the uni-
versity's computer system and internet services did not constitute a
public forum according to the court.3 6 Speech in a public forum is af-
forded greater protection than speech elsewhere.37
C. Students' First Amendment Rights
The government may restrict an employee's speech somewhat
more than it can the general public's speech, and it may restrict the
27. VA. CODE AN. § 2.1-804 to -806 (1999).
28. 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 1998), rev'd sub nom. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d
401 (4th Cir. 2000).
29. See Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 1998).
30. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000).
31. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
32. See Gilmore, 216 F.3d at 406-07.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 409.
35. 956 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Okla. 1997).
36. See id. at 955.
37. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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speech of children, especially those in its custody, more than that of
the general public.38 Such restrictions, however, must still pass the
tests of sufficient governmental interest and narrow tailoring.
In Meyer v. Nebraska,39 the United States Supreme Court rejected
the State's attempts to control the information which students re-
ceived at private schools. At the time, a Nebraska statute prohibited
teachers from instructing students in any language other than En-
glish until the students had completed the eighth grade. In 1920, a
school teacher named Meyer was convicted of violating this law when
he taught German to a ten-year-old child. After the Nebraska Su-
preme Court affirmed the conviction, Meyer appealed the decision to
the U.S. Supreme Court, claiming that the statute "unreasonably in-
fringes the liberty guaranteed to [him] by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."40 In the opinion delivered by Justice McReynolds, the Court
asserted that "it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children
education suitable to their station in life."41 The opinion made the
assumption that the school acts as an agent of the parent while the
child is in attendance at school. As an agent of the parent, the "power
of the State ... to make reasonable regulations for all schools ... is
not questioned."42
While the Court stood firm on the rights of parents and schools to
control the education provided to children, it did not give them uncon-
ditional power. The Court strongly stated that the State must respect
"the fundamental rights" of the individual.43 It is unclear, however,
whether this statement applies to the rights of the teacher or of the
student. It is likely that the rights of both were affirmed. In its rul-
ing, the Court determined that the teaching of German was not
"clearly harmful" and therefore the State statute was
unconstitutional. 4 4
In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the landmark case Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,45 concerning
the rights of students to exercise free speech in school. Several stu-
dents had planned to wear black armbands to school to protest the
country's involvement in the Vietnam war. School administrators dis-
covered the students' plans in advance and promptly adopted a policy
38. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (holding that minors do not have
the exact rights of adults regarding access to obscene materials).
39. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
40. Id. at 399.
41. Id. at 400.
42. Id. at 402.
43. Id. at 403.
44. This ruling implied that the State may restrict education in cases where harm
may occur. However, the Court was not explicit in advocating this control as a
general principle. See id.
45. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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requiring any student wearing an armband to remove it or face sus-
pension. The students wore their armbands to school and were sus-
pended when they refused to remove them.
The United States Supreme Court began the Tinker opinion by
holding that while in school, students are "persons under the U.S.
Constitution, who possess attendant constitutional rights."46 The
Court acknowledged the two countervailing forces present in the case
- the right of schools to control conduct and the right of students to
free speech. It ruled that the students were expressing "'pure speech'"
because "the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case
was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct
by those participating in it."47 This case was contrasted with Cox v.
Louisiana,48 in which two thousand black students protesting segre-
gation were dispersed with tear gas. In that case, Justice Goldberg
wrote:
We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the First and Four-
teenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would com-
municate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on
streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate
ideas by pure speech.4 9
Students exercising pure speech, it seems, enjoy greater freedom than
students who communicate with more disruptive forms of expression.
In the majority opinion of Tinker, Justice Fortas strongly asserted
the rights of students in schools by stating that "[i]t can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate"5 0
and "students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only
that which the State chooses to communicate."51 However, Justice
Fortas also acknowledged that "the Court has repeatedly emphasized
the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and
of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safe-
guards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools."52
The Court established an oft-quoted criterion to indicate whether
the rights of the students or the schools were to take precedence. The
opinion states that "the regulation [against the wearing of armbands]
would violate the constitutional rights of students, at least if it could
not be justified by a showing that the students' activities would mate-
rially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the
46. Id. at 503.
47. Id. at 505.
48. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
49. Id. at 555.
50. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
51. Id. at 510.
52. Id. at 507.
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school."53 If the students' speech substantially disrupts the school's
work and discipline, the school has a right to restrict it. However, if
the students' speech is not disruptive, schools are prohibited from cur-
tailing it. In Tinker, the Court ruled that the students were exercising
"pure speech," which by definition is non-disruptive, and is therefore
protected by the First Amendment.
Tinker raises important issues concerning the right of the school to
restrict student access to the Internet. Student e-mail messages and
Usenet news group postings may appear to be in the category of "pure
speech" because they cause little perceived disruption of school work.
Classes and other school activities are unaffected when a student
sends a message. However, in the not-so-distant future, classes may
include on-line discussions among students in a virtual classroom. In
this setting, a student's inappropriate use of the computer system is
analogous to the student's making inappropriate comments in a class-
room. This type of speech could be considered disruptive and would be
subject to restriction by the school.
In the cases analyzed above, courts viewed the right to free speech
as the right to send information freely to others. However, the courts
have broadened the definition of free speech to include a bi-directional
flow of information; the Constitution guarantees the right not only to
send information, but also to receive information. 54
In Sheck v. Baileyville School Committee,55 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maine wrestled with balancing the rights
of students to receive information against the right of a school to regu-
late the information coming into the school. The Baileyville School
Committee had removed from the school library Ronald Glasser's 365
Days, a compilation of nonfiction Vietnam War accounts by American
combat soldiers. The book contained coarse language and profane
uses of "Jesus Christ" and "God," which the committee deemed objec-
tionable. The Sheck court refused to use the Tinker test because the
committee's banning the book did not "directly restrict the readers'
right to initiate expression but rather their right to receive informa-
tion and ideas, the indispensable reciprocal of any meaningful right of
expression."5 6 In the case of receiving information, the court
explained:
The information and ideas in books placed in a school library by proper au-
thority are protected speech and the first amendment right of students to re-
ceive that information and those ideas is entitled to constitutional protection.
A book may not be banned from a public school library in disregard of the
requirements of the fourteenth amendment. 57
53. Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
54. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
55. 530 F. Supp. 679 (1982).
56. Id. at 685.
57. Id. at 689 (footnote omitted).
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Therefore, the court ruled for an interim injunctive relief from the
ban.
The right of students to receive information has important implica-
tions for decisions regarding the Internet. As schools connect to the
network, they access a broad web of information sources. Some of the
information has educational value, but some of it, including porno-
graphic and violent material, has little value for schools. With an es-
tablished right to receive information, the issue becomes whether
students can demand access to all information accessible from the
school's Internet connection.
Some schools have taken measures to prevent students from acces-
sing inappropriate content. Some schools have used a technical solu-
tion that limits Internet access to a few selected news groups with
perceived educational value. Others have adopted policies to prevent
students from accessing inappropriate information. For example,
some schools have created an Acceptable Usage Policy (AUP), a quasi-
legal document in which students and parents agree not to use the
network for non-educational purposes. The texts of the AUPs vary
from school to school, but generally the student relinquishes the right
to receive certain information over the network, and the school has the
right to terminate a student's network privileges if the student uses
the Internet to access inappropriate information.
Similarly, in Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District,58 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit drew a distinction
between information received from textbooks and from libraries. The
high school in Strongsville, Ohio, refused to approve Joseph Heller's
Catch 22 and Kurt Vonnegut's God Bless You Mr. Rosewater as texts
or library books, ordered Vonnegut's Cat's Cradle and Heller's Catch
22 to be removed from the library, and issued resolutions that served
to prohibit teacher and student discussion of these books in class or
their use as supplemental reading.
The opinion of the case was divided into multiple sections. The
first section, entitled "The Board's Decision not to Approve or
Purchase Certain Texts," dealt exclusively with the issue of textbooks.
The Court ruled that "we find no federal constitutional violation in
this Board's exercise of curriculum and textbook control as empowered
by the Ohio statute."59 The second section, entitled "The Removal of
Certain Books from the School Library," dealt exclusively with the is-
sue of the library. In this case, the Court found that the school had
less power in exercising control:
Neither the State of Ohio nor the Strongsville School Board was under any
federal constitutional compulsion to provide a library for the Strongsville
High School or to choose any particular books. Once having created such a
58. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
59. Id. at 580.
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privilege for the benefit of its students, however, neither body could place con-
ditions on the use of the library which were related solely to the social or polit-
ical tastes of school board members.
6 0
Therefore, the school can exercise great control, a priori, over the deci-
sion to attain a book for the school library. However, once the book is
in the library, the school cannot remove it without extenuating
circumstances.
The law regarding use of the Internet in schools is dependent on
whether the network is viewed as a textbook, library, or neither. The
Internet is an abundant network of digital files, web pages, and
Usenet news groups. Once the school connects to the network, it has
established a link to each of these sources. The connection can be un-
derstood as having instantaneously created an enormous digital
school library. The ruling in Minarcini would indicate that the school
does not have a right to restrict access to information existing in a
library. An analogy can be drawn from the school's selection of books
for its library to the selection of information for its digital library. By
signing an AUP before receiving access to the Internet, the student
has agreed that only certain types of files on the Internet are part of
the school domain. Schools that do not use an AUP when they connect
to the network seem to place themselves in a precarious situation;
once the digital library has been established, the school may not have
a right to restrict students from the information it houses.
The U.S. Supreme Court further examined the conflict between
banning a library book and free speech in Board of Education v.
Pico.6 1 In Pico, a school board attempted to remove controversial ti-
tles, such as Slaughterhouse Five and Soul on Ice, from the school li-
brary. Though the board's action had not restricted students' own
expression, as the ban on armbands in Tinker had, the Supreme Court
rejected it because the board was restricting what minors could read.
The Court stated that "the right to receive ideas is a necessary predi-
cate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech,
press, and political freedom,"62 and wrote: "students too are benefi-
ciaries of this principle."63
The Court noted that public schools have significant latitude to re-
strict minors' receipt of information if the school's judgment is based
objectively on the "educational suitability" of the information, rather
than on an official's disagreement with or disapproval of the content of
the information.6 4 Even as it forbade schools from removing books
from school libraries on ideological bases, the Pico plurality permitted
60. Id. at 582.
61. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
62. Id. at 867.
63. Id. at 868.
64. See id. at 871.
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the removal of books if officials were motivated by concerns that the
books lacked "educational suitability" or were "pervasively vulgar."6 5
The plurality also accorded schools substantial discretion to control
minors' access to ideas when designing curricula.6 6 The measures
which schools typically use to prevent computers from being used to
access pornography would likely fall into this permissible category. If
the rationale is carefidly-worded, the measures could be perceived
more as preserving an educationally suitable environment rather than
silencing a particular message. The Court makes a distinction be-
tween viewpoint-based discrimination and content-based discrimina-
tion, the latter being less repugnant to constitutional principles and
given more leeway. The Pico plurality emphasized that the case was
limited in scope because it dealt only with library books, not text-
books, and made the distinction because library books "by their nature
are optional rather than required reading."67
Petitioners might well defend their claim of absolute discretion in matters of
curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate community values. But
we think that petitioners' reliance upon that duty is misplaced where, as here,
they attempt to extend their claim of absolute discretion beyond the compul-
sory environment of the classroom, in the school library and the regime of
voluntary inquiry that there holds sway.6 s
The school board has a duty to "inculcate community values," but
that duty does not extend to non-compulsory domains such as the
school library.69 The implications for the Internet depend on the ex-
tent to which it is a compulsory domain. On one hand, the schools
that are connecting to the Internet are using the network for class
work and exercises. On the other hand, the school is also making the
network available to students to use at their own discretion for re-
search or communication purposes. The law suggests that the stu-
dents may have different rights based on how they are using the
network. It is conceivable that during school hours, use of the net-
work will be restricted, but after hours it will be completely free. In
the case of the library, the plurality in Pico asserted that the motiva-
tion of a ban determines its constitutional validity:
Our Constitution does not permit the official suppression of ideas. Thus
whether petitioners' removal of books from their school libraries denied re-
spondents their First Amendment rights depends upon the motivation behind
petitioners' actions. If petitioners intended by their removal decision to deny
respondents access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, and if this in-
tent was the decisive factor in the petitioners' decision, then petitioners have
exercised their discretion in violation of the Constitution. 70
65. Id. at 871.
66. See id. at 864.
67. Id. at 862.
68. Id. at 869.
69. Id. at 869.
70. Id. at 871.
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While it is clear that the school has some right to restrict informa-
tion that is vulgar or obscene, it does not have a constitutional right to
restrict information because of the ideas conveyed in it. This distinc-
tion is entirely appropriate in regulating access to the Internet.
The Pico decision was a plurality, with two concurring opinions in
addition to a strong dissent written by Chief Justice Warren Burger.
The dissenting opinion took issue with the majority's decision that the
ban was in violation of students' First Amendment rights to receive
information. Chief Justice Burger wrote that although Stanley v.
Georgia7l establishes the right to receive information, it "does not
carry with it the concomitant right to have those ideas affiatively
provided at a particular place by the government."7 2
Chief Justice Burger argued that although the government pro-
vided the school with a library, it was not obliged to stock the library
with controversial books.73 Similarly, those who invest resources in
connecting schools to the National Information Infrastructure (NII)
may not feel obligated to provide students with controversial informa-
tion. Currently, the task is to lay wires and give schools physical tele-
communications connections. However, once the classrooms are wired
up, the issue will turn to the information schools will receive over the
NIL
In Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of Loudoun County
Library,74 a federal district court held that a public library's use of
filtering software violated the First Amendment because the act of fil-
tering out certain Internet sites was a form of censorship. The court
ruled that the First Amendment prevents a public library from plac-
ing content-based restrictions on access to materials in its collection.
The public library had created a limited public forum for both expres-
sion and receipt of ideas; therefore, any restrictions on such expressive
activity would be reviewed under the "strict scrutiny" standard. The
court concluded that the filtering software could not withstand strict
scrutiny as it was over-inclusive and lacking in standards, and it per-
manently enjoined the library from enforcing its filtering policy. The
library did not appeal the decision.
While the Loudoun decision may give pause to public schools about
using filtering software, it is unlikely that the court's reasoning would
be applied to public schools. Neither the educational programming
nor the library within a public school is likely to be considered an open
forum. When a school provides Internet access as part of its educa-
tional program, it provides the access as an educational resource to
support the school's educational goals, not to allow unlimited expres-
71. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
72. Pico, 457 U.S. at 888 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
73. See id.
74. 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998).
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sion and receipt of ideas. It is more likely that courts will apply the
standards of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier7 5 and Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser7 6 to school-based Internet access.
Those decisions hold that schools are free to regulate access and ex-
pression as long as the restrictions are based on "legitimate pedagogi-
cal concerns."7 7
The Internet can be used for a variety of educational functions
within the school. While schools have used the Internet primarily as
an information source replacing or supplementing textbooks and li-
braries, they can also use it as a communication tool. In fact, while
the Internet was initially developed as a means to access information
remotely, it has gained popular support mainly due to its communica-
tions capabilities. The school newspaper is an important means of
student communication, both within the school and with the commu-
nity. Schoolchildren are increasingly using the Internet to produce
on-line school newspapers through web pages and file sharing
applications.
Just as in the case of textbooks and libraries, students do not have
full First Amendment rights in publishing school newspapers. Since
students are using the Internet to publish school newspapers, deci-
sions of the courts on the rights to free speech in newspapers have
implications for rights and censorship of school Internet connections.
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hazelwood School Dis-
trict v. Kuhlmeier,V8 a case involving the rights of school officials to
censor the student-run newspaper. The school principal had removed
two pages from a school newspaper because they included articles on
students' experiences with pregnancy and the effect of divorce on stu-
dents. The principal objected to the pregnancy article because the
pregnant students, although not named, might be identified from the
text, and because he believed there were inappropriate references to
sex and birth control. He objected to the divorce article because the
students' parents were not given an opportunity to respond to the
article.
The majority first determined whether the students participated in
a public forum:
The public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and
other traditional forums .... Hence, school facilities may be deemed to be
public forums only if school authorities have "by policy or by practice" opened
those facilities "for indiscriminate use by the general public," .... If the facili-
ties have been reserved for other intended purposes, "communicative or other-
wise," then no public forum has been created, and school officials may impose
75. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
76. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
77. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
78. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and other mem-
bers of the school community.79
Thus, the school may regulate student speech so long as a student
communication platform does not provide a public forum in the school.
However, if the school has created a public forum, regulation by school
officials would seem to be in violation of the First Amendment. The
Court ruled in Hazelwood that the school newspaper was not a public
forum because it was part of the overall curriculum of the school.
Therefore, the school was not in violation of the students' rights by
censoring articles.
The Court distinguished Tinker8O on the grounds that Tinker ad-
dressed whether the school had a right to restrict the speech of a stu-
dent on school grounds, while Hazelwood "concerns educators'
authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions,
and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of
the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school."8 1 A school newspaper is viewed as a representative organ of
the school, whether it physically includes the school masthead, seal,
motto, or name. In contrast, students who wear armbands represent
only themselves. The school enjoys a greater right to regulate than in
Tinker because the students who wore armbands in Tinker were not
speaking in an official school capacity. Furthermore, the school in
Tinker had punished the students for acts of speech it did not condone.
In Hazelwood, the school used preventive measures by refusing access
to its resources (i.e. newspaper printing) before the inappropriate
speech was communicated.
Since the cases are different, the Court decided that the standard
articulated in Tinker ("materially and substantially disrupt the work
and discipline of the school,")82 need not also be the standard for Ha-
zelwood. Instead, it ruled that the school will not be in violation of the
First Amendment if it "take[s] into account the emotional maturity of
the intended audience in determining whether to disseminate student
speech on potentially sensitive topics,"8 3 and if the control it exercises
is "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."8 4 This cri-
terion - reasonable relatedness to legitimate pedagogical concerns -
has become known as the Hazelwood test and is used in similar cases
to determine if First Amendment rights have been violated.
79. Id. at 267 (citations omitted).
80. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
81. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
82. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
83. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
84. Id. at 272.
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Two recent federal cases8 5 have used the Hazelwood test to deter-
mine whether school regulations and control violated students' rights.
In both cases, the courts found that the school's imprimatur was pre-
sent and the school was acting with legitimate pedagogical concern.
With both conditions of the Hazelwood test fulfilled, the courts found
that the schools had not violated the students' First Amendment
rights.
The application of the Hazelwood test to the Internet in schools has
yielded conflicting answers. On one hand, news groups and public e-
mail lists on the Internet are public forums; they are accessible to any-
one with a computer, modem, and connection from an Internet service
provider. The local area network (LAN) within the school, if one ex-
ists, is not an open forum, because only those users with accounts on
the system can be part of the network. However, once the school LAN
is connected to the Internet, messages and files that are sent over the
Internet enter the public domain. Many schools have chosen not to
connect to the Internet directly, but only to download information
from the Internet onto the school server. In this case, the school is not
fully connecting itself to the Internet public. However, for those
schools with "full Internet connectivity" (e.g., "www.," "telnet.," or
"ftp"), the school network becomes part of a global public data net-
work. The Hazelwood test strongly suggests that those schools may
not restrict student speech over the Internet because the network is a
public forum. The second Hazelwood criterion paints a different pic-
ture for Internet use. A school has a right to restrict speech if the
speech carries the school's imprimatur. Whenever any file is sent
from the school over the Internet, whether an e-mail message, web
page or ftp file, the data packets contain the Internet address from
where the file originated. In fact, the address is recorded when stu-
dents send information, and when they retrieve information from the
network. (All www and gopher servers and FTP sites log the ad-
dresses of all users who access information at that site.) In most
cases, the Internet address is of the form name@school.edu, marking
the imprimatur of the school in any information exchange. Therefore,
application of the Hazelwood test suggests that the school may have a
right to restrict the information sent or received through e-mail, ftp,
gopher, and the web.
D. Fourth Amendment Concerns
There are two schools of thought regarding privacy. The first is
that the public entity owns the computer resource. Thus it may, if it
wishes, take a position that information on its resources is not privi-
85. The cases are Virgil v. School Bd., 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989), and Planned
Parenthood v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991).
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leged or private, and that it may access such information at any time.
The second is that users of the entity's computer resources have some
expectation of privacy in order to ensure that the entity does not ac-
cess their e-mail or personal data files stored on the entity's computer
resources.
Private industry has generally adopted the first position, and has
enforced it by providing users with notice that their communications
and use of the employer's computer resources are not private and that
messages may be intercepted and read by the employer. At present,
there is no serious legal challenge to this position. The result should
be the same for public entities as long as they give adequate warning
(i.e., notice by way of a computer use policy) to users of the lack of
privacy involved in using the entity's computer resources. Nonethe-
less, a public entity would have to implement special security mea-
sures to protect confidential personnel matters and other proprietary
or highly confidential information.
In the context of e-mail, privacy considerations must also address
the nature of electronic communications. Both the nature of electronic
mail and the public character of governmental business make elec-
tronic mail less private than most users anticipate or understand. E-
mail is more like a postcard than a telephone call or letter in a sealed
envelope. The contents of an e-mail message are literally out in the
open and can be viewed during the mailing process.
As employees of governmental subdivisions, school staff members
have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from "unreasonable"
searches and seizures. In O'Connor v. Ortega,8 6 the United States Su-
preme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment applies only when a
public employee has "'an expectation of privacy that society is pre-
pared to consider reasonable." 8 7 Whether such an expectation exists
depends upon the circumstances, including the employer's policies and
practices. If the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the
public employer may conduct a work search only if it is "reasonable[ I
under all the circumstances."8 8
This rule would likely apply equally to searches of employees' com-
puter files and electronic mail. If an employee has a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in those files, the employer must have a reasonable
basis to review them in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment.
Such an expectation may be minimized by written, distributed policy,
warning of potential searches.
86. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
87. Id. at 715 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
88. Id. at 725-26.
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1. Electronic Communications Privacy Act
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)s9 protects the
privacy of electronic communications, including electronic mail. The
ECPA contains an exception for the provider of the electronic commu-
nications service which is generally thought to be applicable to em-
ployers who provide a computer system for use by employees. In
addition, the EPCA does not apply when an individual has consented
to the monitoring, and that consent may be implied from the
circumstances.
Generally speaking, the EPCA is not likely to present a significant
obstacle to school district monitoring of employee e-mail communica-
tions. The advisable course for an employer to ensure that its review
of employees' e-mail and Internet is in compliance with the law is to
establish and disseminate a policy notifying employees that their e-
mail is not private and that it will be monitored.
2. Common Law Right to Privacy
The common law right to privacy provides another potential legal
basis for asserting a right to privacy in computer files and e-mail. An
employee whose e-mail has been reviewed by the employer may file a
common law suit in court for invasion of privacy. The tort of invasion
of privacy requires that the employee have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the material reviewed and that the intrusion be "highly of-
fensive to a reasonable person."90 If the employer were to address
these issues in its policy, it would likely immunize itself from these
suits.
Two cases illustrate the possible analysis by future courts. In
Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.,91 an employee sent a series of e-mails to a co-
worker threatening to "kill the backstabbing bastards," and referring
to an upcoming Christmas party as "the Jim Jones Koolaid affair."92
The co-worker became concerned and notified the company, which ter-
minated the employee. The former employee sued, claiming that the
employer had violated his common law right to privacy by reading e-
mails that were intended only for the addressee. The court held that
by sending an e-mail over the company's e-mail system, the plaintiff
had voluntarily given up his expectation of privacy.93 The court fur-
ther held that even if the employee had a reasonable expectation of
privacy regarding his e-mail, the employer's interception of the com-
89. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 (2000).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1965).
91. 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
92. Id. at 98 n.1.
93. See id. at 101.
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munications would not be a substantial and highly offensive invasion
of his privacy.94
In a similar California case, an employee who was fired for sending
an inappropriate e-mail sued, asserting that the employer's intercep-
tion of his e-mail violated his common law right to privacy.95 The
court ruled that the employee did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the e-mail because he had signed a waiver acknowledging
that e-mail use was limited to "company business." 96
IV. POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR FAILING TO RESTRICT
ACCESS TO INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY
While the previous cases have tested the limits of the right of
schools to limit the range of material permitted to be accessed through
school computers, the following cases test the limits of the obligation
of the schools to do so.
A. Allowing Pornography in the Workplace as Sexual
Harassment
Employees are federally guaranteed the "right to work in an envi-
ronment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult."97
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,9s the plaintiff was a fe-
male shipyard worker who had been subjected to sexually demeaning
remarks and jokes made by male workers, "Men Only" signs displayed
throughout the common work area, and a myriad of nude and par-
tially nude pictures of women in the workplace.
The Jacksonville court established a more liberal set of elements to
prove a hostile work environment than had been required in previous
court decisions. The court did not require the plaintiff to prove psy-
chological damage. It held that, in order to prove that the behavior
was unwelcome, a plaintiff must provide credible testimony that she
did not solicit or incite the harassing conduct, and that she regarded
such conduct as undesirable or offensive. The court listed three be-
havior elements which satisfy the requirement of "harassment based
on sex": 1) harassing behavior lacking a sexually explicit content but
directed at women and motivated by animus against women; 2) sexual
behavior directed at women; 3) behavior that is not directed at a par-
ticular individual or group of individuals, but is disproportionately
more offensive or demeaning to one sex. The last category could plau-
94. See id.
95. See Bourke v. Nissen Motor Corp., No. B068705 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (unpub-
lished opinion).
96. Id.
97. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
98. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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sibly include various kinds of pornography which degrade women dis-
proportionately. Under this analysis, a school could be held liable for
sexual harassment if it did not restrict the use of its computers to ex-
clude this type of pornography.
Some courts have held that pornography falls into the category of
actionable behavior because it has a disparate impact on women even
when it is not aimed at any one individual or group of individuals.99
Other cases give further reason to reconsider a no-censorship policy.
In Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 100 supervisors were held liable
when they acquiesced in sexual discrimination. The case involved sex-
ually-explicit pictures in the workplace, employees who were repeat-
edly referred to by co-workers in an offensive and obscene manner, an
employee who was sexually propositioned by a supervisor, and sexu-
ally-explicit materials that were placed in one employee's personal
desk. In Brooms v. Regal Tube Co.,1O1 the court held that a white
male supervisor created a hostile work environment for a black female
employee when he showed her explicit pornography depicting interra-
cial sodomy and bestiality.
The courts have generally applied Title VII's hostile environment
sex harassment by analogy under Title IX for teacher-to-student
claims.302 Most importantly, the Supreme Court in Franklin v. Gwin-
nett County Public Schoolsi03 implicitly recognized a private cause of
action for a hostile environment sexual harassment claim against a
school district under Title IX.104 The Court refused to rule explicitly
on the applicability of Title VII by analogy under Title IX because the
plaintiff did not raise the issue on appeal.i 0 5 Nevertheless, the Court
noted that a supervisor commits sex discrimination when he or she
99. See, e.g., Bennet v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988);
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523-24 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
100. 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
101. 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989).
102. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281-81 (1998).
103. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). In this case, a female student brought a private action claim
under Title IX against both a former teacher and the school district, alleging that
the teacher sexually harassed her on several occasions and that the school system
did not protect her from discrimination. See id. at 63-65. The Court held that the
student was entitled to damages under Title IX from both the individual and the
school district.
104. In Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993), the dis-
trict court cited Franklin to hold that hostile environment claims do apply under
Title IX. See id. at 1575. It noted that the Supreme Court appeared to recognize
the cause of action since there was no quid pro quo involved in the unlawful con-
duct. See id.
105. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65 n.4.
20001
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
sexually harasses a subordinate.06 The Court then concluded that
the same rule should apply when a teacher harasses a student.o 7
Franklin explicitly recognized a claim for teacher-to-student hos-
tile environment sex harassment. 0 8 Some lower courts have relied on
Franklin to recognize student-to-student sex harassment. 0 9 In fact,
some commentators have called for the downloading of pornography
by students to be sex harassment of their fellow students per se.-1 0
B. Suits by Parents for Failure to Protect Their Children
In 1998, a twelve-year-old boy in Livermore, California, spent his
summer using the public library's computers to download sexually ex-
plicit images from the Internet. The library did not place any restric-
tions on adults or children using its Internet computers. The boy
printed his collection of pictures on a relative's computer. When the
youngster's mother learned of his summertime activity, she sued the
Livermore Public Library in Kathleen R. v. City of Livermorel" for
allowing him access to materials harmful to minors. The plaintiff
sued for waste of public funds, nuisance, premises liability, and a de-
nial of substantive due process. The court of appeals agreed with the
lower court's conclusion that the library was not liable. The claims
the parent brought as a taxpayer were preempted by the federal Tele-
communications Act. The court also found that none of the exceptions
to the Act applied. The child was not legally put into the "functional
custody" of the library, nor was the child put into a "special relation-
ship" with the library. The access to the Internet at the library did not
constitute a state-created danger, so there was no corresponding duty
to affirmatively protect the child. Finally, no civil rights entitlement
to relief applied.
106. See id. at 75 (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
107. See id. at 75.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996) ("[In a Title IX suit for gender
discrimination based on sexual harassment of a student, an educational institu-
tion may be held liable under standards similar to those applied in cases under
Title VII."); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1995);
Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1995). But see
Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that Title IX does not impose liability on school district for peer sex harassment
absent a showing that district itself, via supervisors, directly discriminated on
basis of sex); Garza v. Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437, 1438
(S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that hostile environment claims are not actionable
under Title IX).
110. See Evelyn Oldenkamp, Pornography, the Internet, and Student-to-Student Sex-
ual Harassment: A Dilemma Resolved with Title VII and Title IX, 4 DuKE J. GEN-
DER L. & POL'Y 159, 174-177 (1992).
111. 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772 (Ct. App. 2001).
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C. Children's Internet Protection Act
Congress has passed a bill to require schools to filter Internet con-
tent. The Children's Internet Protection Act requires schools to certify
with the FCC that they are using or will use a filtering or blocking
system on computers with Internet access so that students will not be
exposed to harmful Internet material.' 12 A school is not eligible to
receive universal service support for Internet access unless they do so.
To be eligible for universal service, libraries only have to certify that
they are using a filtering or blocking system for one of more of their
computers so that at least one computer will be suitable for minors'
use.
V. EVERY GOOD POLICY DESERVES DEFINITIONS
One of the most significant problems with e-mail and Internet
abuse is that schools can do little before it occurs. Filtering software
may provide some assistance in removing access to offending Internet
material. However, such devices are not always the best solution, par-
ticularly in some academic settings where access to scientific or artis-
tic materials is necessary and relevant to the educational curriculum.
Moreover, some users can and do find ways around these software-
based restrictions. In fact, some web sites are dedicated solely to de-
feating what they call "censorware."11 3 The best tools available to
public entities to stop e-mail and Internet abuse are: 1) a well-written
computer use policy; 2) a system that ensures enforcement of the pol-
icy and revokes the privileges of those who refuse to comply with the
policy.
In light of First Amendment considerations, a well-written policy
defines who may use the computer system, including Internet access
and e-mail privileges, and also defines the permissible and impermis-
sible uses of that system. As noted above, these are primarily policy
issues, but that does not necessarily mean that they are subject to
bargaining, or should be opened to widespread debate.
A. Who Can Use The System, And Under What Conditions?
Many public employers take a very strict approach to defining who
may use the computer system, and restrict access to that system so
that it may only be used for business-related purposes. Personal use
is strictly prohibited, and violations of the policy may result in a tem-
porary or permanent revocation of user privileges.
112. See S. 97, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 4600, 106th Cong. (2000).
113. See, e.g., <http//www.censorware.net>; Rebecca Vesely, Teen Offers Way to Crack




In defining who may use the system, a well-written policy could
grant different levels of access to the system for different persons. For
example, while a school may desire to allow all employees and stu-
dents access to an e-mail account, it may wish to limit Internet access
to those who would benefit from such access, such as administrators,
policy makers, and similar types of employees having a need to access
information over the Internet.
Regardless of the type and level of access to the system, a well-
written policy does not grant users the right to use the entire com-
puter system. It grants them only a revocable privilege to use the sys-
tem as long as the user agrees to abide by the terms and conditions of
the computer-use policy. If a potential user, whether an employee or
student, refuses to agree to abide by the terms of the policy, that per-
son should be denied user privileges for Internet or e-mail. In the case
of students, schools should require the parents of minor students to
read the computer use policy and approve their child's use of the sys-
tem. If the parent refuses to sign such an agreement, the student
should not have Internet and e-mail access.
While such an approach may seem heavy-handed, it is often neces-
sary to enforce a school district's policy effectively. A policy should
require a user to consent to the school's search of the user's computer
files, e-mail, and other documents on the district's computer system to
detect suspected violations of the policy. Without such an agreement,
a user may assert that a search of his or her computer files violates
the Fourth Amendment. A person may always consent to a search,
and an entity may lawfully require such consent as a condition to per-
mitting its employees or students to use the entity's computer system
and resources. A signed computer user agreement would create the
consent necessary to perform a search of the computers and files.
B. Clarifying the Distinction Between Permitted and
Prohibited Use
Besides providing for who may use the school's computer system, a
well-written policy defines all permissible and impermissible uses of
the system in clear and direct language. In defining permissible uses,
it is not crucial to set forth a detailed list. Rather, a more generalized
statement of permissible uses is acceptable. In the context of an aca-
demic computer use policy, it would be permissible to restrict use of
the system to only academic endeavors and to "carry on the business"
of the academic institution.
In a similar manner, the policy should explicitly state that all uses
that are not otherwise permitted under the policy are expressly pro-
hibited. This type of general statement is important because a com-
puter use policy cannot possibly include a description of every type of
impermissible use.
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On the other hand, a policy should set forth as many specific, inap-
propriate uses as possible. A partial list of unacceptable uses may
include:
Destruction or damage to equipment, software, or data belonging to the entity
or others;
Disruption or unauthorized use of accounts, access codes, or identification
numbers;
Use of computer resources to send or store messages and/or materials with the
intent to defraud, harass, defame, or threaten others. (These terms must be
specifically defined according to their current legal definitions. Public entities
should review existing policies and consult with legal counsel regarding the
proper definition of these terms.);
Use of computer resources in ways which intentionally or unintentionally im-
pede the computing activities of others. Such activities include, but are not
limited to: disrupting another's use of computer resources by game playing,
sending an excessive number of messages or e-mail; making or printing exces-
sive copies of documents, files, data, or programs; or introducing computer
viruses of any type onto the computer resources;
Use of computer resources that violates copyright, trademark, or license
agreements;
Use of computer resources to violate another's privacy, including, but not lim-
ited to, accessing or using another user's account, identification number, pass-
word, electronic files, data, or e-mail;
Impersonation of any person or communication under a false or unauthorized
name;
Transmission of any unsolicited advertising, promotional materials, or other
forms of solicitation, including such activities as placing hypertext links to
non-entity related web sites, such as a church, or sectarian organizations,
such as the American Nazi Party;
Using computer resources for commercial purposes or personal financial gain;
Inappropriate mass mailing, "spamming," or "mail bombing";
Tampering with any software protections or restrictions placed on computer
applications or files;
Attempting to circumvent local or network system security measures;
Altering or attempting to alter system software or hardware configurations on
either network systems or local computing devices;
Installing unauthorized software programs on entity-owned computing de-
vices or network systems and/or using such programs;
Ignoring or disobeying policies and procedures established for specific net-
work systems; and
Using computer resources to access adult-oriented sites that contain descrip-
tions or depictions of a pornographic nature, or that permit access to gambling
facilities over the Internet.
The above list is certainly not exhaustive, and as time passes, e-
mail and Internet abuses will continue to grow in number and kind.
The overriding concept is to provide users with advance notice that
certain specific conduct is prohibited and will lead, at the least, to the
revocation of user privileges, and possibly disciplinary action.
The policy also should use wording and descriptions of impermissi-
ble activities that are not subject to varying interpretations. As with
other work rules, if the rule is ambiguous, or if the rule is written in
such a manner that its enforcement depends primarily upon interpre-
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tation of the rule, it is often considered vague and cannot support dis-
cipline against the rule abuser. For example, policies that prohibit the
use of "bad language" or "bad words," or "any illegal activity" may not
be enforceable, while those rules that specifically define the language
or activity prohibited will be.
C. Each Policy Should Contain Enforcement Procedures
That Incorporate Principles Of Due Process
The policy should also define the investigation and enforcement
procedures that may or will be used. At a minimum, the policy should
inform users that they are expected to report policy violations that
they observe, and that alleged violations will be investigated to the
fullest extent necessary.
The policy should establish a procedure for reporting suspected vio-
lations, and should further identify the party or parties responsible for
conducting investigations. Typically, the best person for such respon-
sibilities is a manager of information services (MIS) officer who is
aware of the system, the policy, and the nature of e-mail and Internet
abuse detection. The policy may permit the MIS officer to suspend
user privileges pending investigation of a suspected policy violation,
and would permit the MIS officer to remove any offensive or destruc-
tive material from the system before any damage occurs.
As a practical matter, the enforcement of disciplinary conse-
quences against policy violators could be addressed by incorporating
existing disciplinary policies for employees or students. Disciplinary
procedures are often found in statutes, board policies, administrative
regulations, and collective bargaining agreements or memoranda of
understanding. Since these disciplinary procedures probably have al-
ready been negotiated between the school district and the school's bar-
gaining unit, exclusive representatives may have little objection to the
incorporation of existing disciplinary policies into the computer use
policy.
V. CONCLUSION
The Internet will play an increasingly important role in K-12 edu-
cation. Teachers, parents, school officials, and students are clamoring
to connect to the "information highway" as soon as possible. Much of
the country's energy and money expended so far has been directed at
solving the technical, financial, regulatory, and educational challenges
in wiring up schools. As solutions are found to meet these challenges,
the public will find that new legal questions will arise as a result of
the implementation of a national educational network. Students and
schools will be at odds over whose rights are supreme in the digital
environment. Students will claim that the First and Fourteenth
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Amendments guarantee them the right to unrestricted free speech
over the Internet. School officials will counter that, as an agent of
parents, the school has a duty to protect children from the glut of inap-
propriate information flowing over the Internet.
There have been virtually no case rulings on the rights of students
on the Internet. However, rulings from analogous cases of free speech
in schools may provide principles by which the law for computer net-
works can be extrapolated. Unobtrusive communication on the In-
ternet seems to be similar to the "pure speech" given greater
constitutional protection in schools. However, as the Internet be-
comes a widespread medium of communication within classes and
among students and teachers, speech on the Internet will have the
same potential to disrupt school work as does shouting in the class-
room or picketing in the hallways.
If a student refuses to sign an AUP, the school should not issue an
account on the Internet. As the World Wide Web evolves, however,
the school may have no more of a right to restrict access to the net-
work than to the library. The students may become unwilling to
waive their rights to free speech and will demand full access to the
Internet. Their rights to free speech will be at odds with the rights of
the schools to censor inappropriate information or speech. The law to
be applied will depend on whether the network is viewed as a library,
textbook, or newspaper. With different rules in each of these cases, it
is possible that the courts will base their rulings on how the network
is used. However, it is likely that the network will be used simultane-
ously for a number of different functions. When that happens, the
courts will be compelled to complement legal precedent with innova-
tive decisions that address the multifaceted nature of the Internet.
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